Overview
On October 8, 2026, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard argument in a dispute between two tax collectors over $54,421.96. When Bank of America foreclosed on a house owned by the late Richard Nelson, the sheriff’s sale left a surplus. The surplus went to the Waukesha County clerk of courts, and the United States and the Wisconsin Department of Revenue both claimed it. Nelson died owing the federal government roughly $175,000 and the State roughly $116,000.
A federal statute first enacted in 1797 says the United States is paid first when “the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administrator,” cannot pay all its debts. The court of appeals held that the clerk was functionally an administrator and awarded the surplus to the United States.1 The Department of Revenue asks the Court to reverse. The case turns on two questions of method: how to give effect to eight words of statutory text, and how a state court should treat century-old U.S. Supreme Court precedent built on a canon the modern Court has abandoned.
What You Should Know
Five things to carry into the decision
- The question is one of federal law: whether the deceased-debtor clause of the federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1)(B), reaches a foreclosure surplus held by a court official rather than an executor or administrator.1
- The Department of Revenue argues that “in the custody of the executor or administrator” limits the priority’s reach. Money pulled out of the estate by an involuntary sheriff’s sale is not in that custody, so the default rule — first in time, first in right — governs.
- The United States argues the priority attaches to its claim, not to any particular pot of money. On that view, routing the proceeds through the clerk’s account is a temporary detour that does not defeat the priority.
- Both sides agree that if the estate’s personal representative had sold the house privately, the United States would have taken the surplus first. Asked which reading of the statute it preferred, the United States chose the broadest: priority wherever the money came from the estate.
- Much of the argument concerned vertical precedent. Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Bramwell (1926) and King (1964), read the statute liberally. The State urged the Court to apply their holdings but not their interpretive method. At least one justice warned that ruling for the State could invite swift reversal.
Text Against Precedent
An unusually clean contest: the better reading of the words, against the decisions a state court is bound to follow.
Eight words must do some work
Treating custody as a mere trigger reads “in the custody of the executor or administrator” out of the statute — a phrase set off by commas. A clerk of courts holds a constitutional office with no role in settling estates, and money pulled out by an involuntary sheriff’s sale was never in that custody.
The priority attaches to the claim
The priority follows the federal claim, not a particular pot of money, so routing proceeds through the clerk is a temporary detour. The statute must be broadly construed to protect the treasury, and the Department’s reading is foreclosed by controlling precedent.
What Happened
Richard Nelson died insolvent. His debts included federal and state tax obligations, and a mortgage held by Bank of America. Click any step for detail.
The bank names both tax collectors
Bank of America foreclosed, naming the estate, the United States, and the Department of Revenue as defendants.
A $54,421.96 surplus
The sale paid off the mortgage and left the surplus, which the clerk of courts held pending the circuit court’s order. The federal and state tax claims together far exceeded it.
If the statute does not apply, first in time wins
Both parties agreed below that the ordinary rule — the first lien in time is first in right — would govern.
The clerk is an “administrator”
Waukesha County Circuit Judge Michael P. Maxwell held the statute applied, relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent calling for a liberal reading, and ordered the surplus paid to the United States.2
Court of appeals affirms
Presiding Judge Neubauer reasoned that the clerk exercises control over the surplus and its disposition, and that Nelson’s estate could not pay all of his debts. Under the functional approach of Bramwell and King, that was enough.3
Review granted
By the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the Department makes two arguments: probate law defines an administrator as a person appointed to administer an intestate estate, which a clerk is not; and the surplus is not part of the estate at all. The United States responds that the priority rule must be broadly construed and that the Department’s reading is foreclosed by U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
Legal Background
The federal priority statute provides that a claim of the United States “shall be paid first” in two settings. The first is when a living debtor is insolvent and either makes a voluntary assignment of property, has property attached, or commits an act of bankruptcy. The second is when “the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor.” A companion provision makes a “representative of a person or an estate” personally liable for paying other debts ahead of a federal claim. The statute dates to 1797 and has remained substantively unchanged.4
The U.S. Supreme Court has long construed the statute liberally to protect the federal treasury. In Bramwell, it held the priority reached the assets of an insolvent bank placed in the control of a state superintendent of banks. In King, it held a court-appointed distributing agent liable because he had sufficient control over allocating assets among creditors. Yet even in that era, the Court refused to extend the priority beyond the statute’s terms, as in Hooe, Prince v. Bartlett, and United States v. Oklahoma.
More recently, in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, the Court rejected the practice of construing statutes broadly or narrowly without a textual directive and called for a “fair reading” instead. The U.S. Supreme Court has also instructed lower courts to follow its directly controlling precedent even when later decisions appear to undermine it, leaving to that Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.5
Zoom In
The argument was an unusually clean contest between text and precedent, and both advocates candidly corrected their own briefs along the way. Four themes emerged.
Counsel for the Department of Revenue argued that treating custody as a mere trigger reads “in the custody of the executor or administrator” out of the statute. The phrase is even set off by commas.
Justice Taylor pressed the other side of the ledger. The statute’s conditions are a federal claim and an estate that cannot pay its debts. On the State’s reading, the very insolvency that triggers the priority would leave the United States with nothing to collect. The State answered that the statute was never meant to guarantee recovery.
The State argued that this Court must follow the holdings of Bramwell and King but need not reason the way the 1926 Court did. In its view, the task is to predict how today’s U.S. Supreme Court, applying Encino, would read the statute.
Justice Protasiewicz was skeptical and warned that adopting the State’s position could draw a quick reversal. Counsel for the United States answered that any court, including the U.S. Supreme Court itself, would begin with those precedents, and that only that Court may retire them.
Justice Hagedorn laid out three. Under the first, the money must currently sit with an administrator — the State’s position. Under the second, it must be in the custody of someone functioning as an administrator — the court of appeals’ holding. Under the third, custody is irrelevant so long as the money traces to an insolvent estate.
Counsel for the United States called the theories complementary, then chose the third as clearest for courts and personal representatives. Justice Hagedorn observed that the court of appeals’ analysis would be beside the point under that reading. Another justice asked counsel to name a case in which the government would not win, and counsel acknowledged that with a deceased debtor, it generally does.
Justice Ziegler emphasized that an estate controls nothing about an involuntary sheriff’s sale — not timing, price, or the buyer. A clerk who acts only on court order looks little like an executor.
Justice Crawford asked whether a clerk would face personal liability under the statute’s representative-liability clause. The United States said no, because a clerk following a court order acts lawfully. On rebuttal, the State argued that this concession narrows the priority itself: in Bramwell, the Court read the liability clause and the priority clause together. The State also distinguished an escrow agent in a private sale, who acts for the estate, from a sheriff, who acts as an arm of the court.
Each side made concessions. The State withdrew an argument about the mortgage holder’s priority and disavowed an analogy equating a voluntary sale with an assignment; the United States defended a reading under which the custody clause does little independent work. The State’s textual argument is the more disciplined reading of the words Congress wrote. The difficulty is that this Court is a state court applying federal law, bound by decisions it cannot narrow simply because the U.S. Supreme Court’s method has since changed.
What’s Next
A decision is expected before the term closes on June 30, 2027.
First in time governs surpluses
Lien priority would govern foreclosure surpluses from insolvent estates and could send state tax dollars to the State in similar cases. It would also invite a petition for certiorari by the United States.
On which rationale?
The court of appeals’ narrower functional-control reasoning, or the broader claim-based reading. Which one the Court chooses will determine how much of the custody clause survives in Wisconsin courts.
Holdings versus method
Whether the opinion squarely addresses the State’s argument that a lower court may apply a precedent’s holding without its interpretive method. That discussion would travel well beyond tax collection.
Endnotes & Authorities · 5 citations
- Bank of America, N.A. v. Estate of Nelson, No. 2023AP1549 (Wis. argued Oct. 8, 2026) (review granted May 20, 2026), on review of 2025 WI App 61, 418 Wis. 2d 412, 27 N.W.3d 199 (Neubauer, P.J., for a panel of Neubauer, P.J., and Gundrum and Lazar, JJ.).
- Id. ¶ 1. The approximate amounts of the federal (about $175,431) and state (about $115,975) claims are drawn from contemporaneous reporting on the decision.
- Id. (functional-control holding).
- 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1), (b); Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 512, 515.
- Bramwell v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 269 U.S. 483 (1926); King v. United States, 379 U.S. 4 (1964); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77 (1975); United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805); Prince v. Bartlett, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 431 (1814); United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 88–89 (2018); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Characterizations of argument are drawn from the October 8, 2026 oral-argument recording.