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Wildwood Estate, LLC v. Village of Summit

Zoning or Police Power?

Short-term rentals ask the Court to define its own test — and to say, for the first time, what Wisconsin’s 2017 right-to-rent statute leaves municipalities free to do.

Argued Oct. 8, 2026
Wisconsin Supreme Court
No. 2024AP178
Reviewing 2025 WI App 47
7 days
The statutory floor municipalities cannot cross
6
Zwiefelhofer factors in play
$55K
Fee award riding on the § 1983 claim
$10K/day
Maximum penalty under the ordinance
I

Overview

On October 8, 2026, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard argument over a Waukesha County village’s ban on vacation rentals shorter than seven days. In 2019, the Village of Summit adopted a short-term rental ordinance through its ordinary legislative process rather than the notice-and-hearing procedures required for zoning changes. Wildwood Estate, which had been renting its home for stays of three to seven nights, sued.

Both lower courts held that the ordinance was a zoning ordinance in substance, voided it for want of zoning procedures, found a federal due process violation, and awarded more than $55,000 in attorney fees.1 The Village asks the Court to reverse. This is the Court’s first look at Wisconsin’s 2017 “right to rent” statute, Wis. Stat. § 66.1014 — and a chance to say what its multi-factor test for identifying a zoning ordinance is actually meant to measure.

II

What You Should Know

Five things to carry into the decision

  • Section 66.1014 bars municipalities from prohibiting residential rentals of seven consecutive days or longer, but preserves their authority to adopt ordinances not inconsistent with the statute. Summit regulated the gap the statute left open: stays of six days or fewer.1
  • Zoning ordinances require plan-commission review, public notice, and a hearing; ordinary police-power ordinances do not. Whether an ordinance is “zoning” turns on the functional test of Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, a non-exhaustive set of six characteristics weighed with the ordinance’s purpose.
  • The Village argues the statute’s placement in Chapter 66, outside the zoning chapters, shows the Legislature let municipalities choose either route. It adds that a villagewide rule regulating how property is rented, not where, is not zoning at all.
  • Wildwood argues that short stays were a permitted use under Summit’s existing residential zoning, and that eliminating that use everywhere amounts to a zoning amendment adopted without the required procedures.
  • Several justices pressed both sides on a threshold problem: whether the Court is asking if an ordinance could be zoning, must be zoning, or is “quintessentially” zoning. The bench also showed skepticism toward the federal due process ruling and the fee award built on it.
III

Two Ways to Read the Ordinance

Both sides agree Summit could have regulated short-term rentals through zoning. They disagree about whether it had to.

The Village · Police power

A rule about how, not where

Section 66.1014 sits in Chapter 66, outside the zoning chapters, and nowhere requires zoning authority for sub-seven-day rules. A villagewide rule regulating how property is rented creates no districts and is not zoning at all.

Advantage: the statute’s placement, and the first Zwiefelhofer factor — no districts. Vulnerability: the ordinance eliminates a use that was lawful under existing zoning.
Wildwood · Zoning in substance

A zoning amendment by another name

Short stays were a permitted use under Summit’s residential zoning. Eliminating that use everywhere is a zoning amendment, and it was adopted without plan-commission review, notice, or a hearing.

Advantage: both lower courts agreed, and the panel found the ordinance took “a substantial stick out of Wildwood’s bundle.” Vulnerability: counsel could cite no authority holding that a zoning code’s silence creates a protected use.
IV

What Happened

The ordinance was modeled on a neighboring village’s and codified among the business regulations, not the zoning code. Click any step for detail.

2017

Wildwood buys in the Country Residential District

The home sits in Summit’s Country Residential District.

Read more
2018–19

Rented for three to seven nights

Wildwood rented the home through an online platform, most stays shorter than a week.

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Aug. 2019

Ordinance No. 71-2019 adopted — without a hearing

After several board discussions but no public hearing, the Village adopted an ordinance requiring an annual license and a per-rental permit, mandating a guest register, prohibiting rentals “for six consecutive days or fewer,” and imposing penalties of $1,000 to $10,000 per day. It was codified in Chapter 6 of the Village Code, governing businesses, rather than the Chapter 111 zoning code, and bypassed the plan-commission and hearing procedures of Wis. Stat. § 62.23.2

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2021

Nonconforming-use request denied

The Village denied Wildwood’s request for an exemption. Wildwood sued for a declaratory judgment and asserted a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Circuit court

Summary judgment for Wildwood, plus fees

Waukesha County Circuit Judge Michael P. Maxwell held the ordinance void as a zoning ordinance adopted without zoning procedures, and awarded $55,087.95 in fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

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2025

Court of appeals affirms

In a published opinion by Judge Lazar, the panel applied the Zwiefelhofer factors and found the ordinance created no districts but otherwise looked like zoning: it prohibited a use rather than regulating its operation, applied a fixed forward-looking rule, and eliminated a use lawful under existing zoning, taking “a substantial stick out of Wildwood’s bundle.” It dismissed the Village’s purpose statement as “self-serving.”3

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May 20, 2026

Review granted

On whether the Village “properly used its police powers (rather than zoning regulation)” in exercising its reserved authority under § 66.1014.

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Before the Supreme Court, the Village argues that § 66.1014 nowhere requires zoning authority for sub-seven-day rules and that the factors favor police power; Wildwood defends both lower courts. The panel below treated as irrelevant the question whether the ordinance complied with § 66.1014 at all.

V

Legal Background

Zoning is a subset of a municipality’s police power, but it comes with procedural strings. A village that amends its zoning code must route the change through its plan commission and give public notice and a hearing. Because there is no settled definition of a “zoning ordinance,” Zwiefelhofer adopted a functional approach.

Courts consider whether an ordinance (1) divides a municipality into districts; (2) allows some uses as of right and prohibits others within those districts; (3) controls where a use occurs rather than how; (4) classifies uses in general, comprehensive terms; (5) makes fixed, forward-looking determinations rather than case-by-case ones; and (6) allows existing uses to continue. The list is non-exhaustive, and the analysis is not a tally. State ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold restated the factors in 2021, and a recent District IV decision described the ultimate inquiry as whether an ordinance is “quintessentially” zoning.4

The Legislature enacted § 66.1014 in 2017. It forbids an ordinance that prohibits renting a residential dwelling for seven consecutive days or longer, allows municipalities to require permits and inspections, and preserves their authority to enact ordinances not inconsistent with the statute. Before the statute, the court of appeals held in Heef Realty that short-term rentals were a permitted use in a single-family district whose zoning code contained no durational limit.5

Unlike neighboring provisions in Chapter 66, § 66.1014 says nothing about zoning procedures. Whether that silence is permission or an oversight is much of the case.

VI

Zoom In

Much of the hour went to the Court’s own test, not the ordinance. Four lines of questioning stood out.

Justice Hagedorn returned repeatedly to the object of the Zwiefelhofer inquiry. Both sides agreed Summit could have regulated short-term rentals through zoning. He asked whether the question is whether an ordinance could be zoning, must be zoning, or is so much like zoning that it cannot be described as anything else.

Later, a justice likened the factor-by-factor debate to arguing whether a table is “made of wood” or is “a wooden table,” and asked what question the factors are meant to answer. Wildwood’s counsel ultimately accepted the most demanding framing: the ordinance could only be zoning.

Justice Protasiewicz pressed Wildwood on the first factor: a villagewide rule creates no districts at all. Justice Taylor read the second factor as flowing from the first and asked where the districts and zones were in Wildwood’s theory.

She tested its limiting principle with a speed limit on a Madison street lowered from 30 to 25. If prohibiting a previously lawful activity makes an ordinance zoning, the exception swallows the rule. Another justice posed a villagewide ban on backyard chickens. Wildwood answered that its ordinance controls where short stays may occur: nowhere.

One justice called Wildwood’s permitted-use theory creative but unsupported. Zoning codes enumerate permitted uses, and the cases Wildwood cited interpreted the meaning of “single-family dwelling” before § 66.1014 existed. Counsel could identify no other authority holding that a zoning code’s silence creates a protected use.

Another justice questioned why the statute’s placement outside the zoning chapters did not answer the case, and criticized Zwiefelhofer’s factors as poorly suited to a municipality with an existing zoning scheme.

A justice asked whether a failure to follow statutory zoning procedures ever amounts to a constitutional deprivation. Procedures adopted by statute may serve due process values without being constitutionally required, and a void ordinance carries its own post-deprivation remedy.

Wildwood’s counsel could cite no precedent for a § 1983 claim premised on skipped zoning procedures. The Village, which has already paid the fee award, asked for a remand with instructions.

The more disciplined path is the one the Village urged on rebuttal and several justices seemed to share: read § 66.1014 as the Legislature wrote it, then apply a test whose object is defined in advance. A multi-factor standard without a stated question invites results-driven weighing in either direction. The property-rights case against Summit is real — a $10,000-a-day penalty for a five-night stay is no small thing — but Wildwood’s theory would require courts to treat every new prohibition on a previously unregulated activity as a zoning amendment.

VII

What’s Next

A decision is expected before the term closes on June 30, 2027. Short-term rental regulation is spreading across Wisconsin’s lake and tourist communities.

Watch first

Does the Court reframe Zwiefelhofer?

Around a single defined question, such as whether the ordinance is “quintessentially” zoning. That refinement would govern municipal ordinances far beyond rentals.

Watch second

The § 1983 judgment and fee award

A reversal could unwind both, and with them the theory that skipped statutory procedure is a federal constitutional injury.

Already citing it

The ripple has started

The court of appeals cited Wildwood in a July 2026 decision striking down a Door County village’s bedroom cap as preempted by § 66.1014.6

A reversal could clarify that municipalities may regulate sub-seven-day rentals through their general police power, while leaving § 66.1014’s seven-day floor intact.

Endnotes & Authorities · 6 citations
  1. Wildwood Estate, LLC v. Village of Summit, No. 2024AP178 (Wis. argued Oct. 8, 2026) (review granted May 20, 2026), on review of 2025 WI App 47 (Lazar, J., for a panel of Gundrum, P.J., and Grogan and Lazar, JJ.); Wis. Stat. § 66.1014(2)(a), (c)–(d); see 2017 Wis. Act 59.
  2. Id. ¶¶ 2–12; Summit, Wis., Code ch. 6, art. V, §§ 6-157(b), (e)(4), (g), 6-158 (Ordinance No. 71-2019, Aug. 15, 2019).
  3. Id. ¶¶ 23–38 (zoning analysis), ¶ 32 (“substantial stick”), ¶ 36 (purpose statement), ¶¶ 39–51 (due process and fees); id. n.11 (§ 66.1014). Waukesha Cnty. Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV631 (Maxwell, J.).
  4. Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 2012 WI 7, 338 Wis. 2d 488, 809 N.W.2d 362; State ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold, 2021 WI 6, 395 Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323; Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of Madison (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. IV); Wis. Stat. §§ 61.35, 62.23(7)(d).
  5. Heef Realty & Investments, LLP v. City of Cedarburg Board of Appeals, 2015 WI App 23, 361 Wis. 2d 185, 861 N.W.2d 797; see also Wis. Stat. §§ 66.1015, 66.1017.
  6. Clinton v. Village of Sister Bay, No. 2025AP1825 (Wis. Ct. App. July 14, 2026) (recommended for publication). Characterizations of argument are drawn from the October 8, 2026 oral-argument recording.

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