Oral Argument Primer
Institute for Reforming Government
All October primers

State v. Samuel R. Osornio

Probability or Possibility?

A jury note tests the limits of Strickland — and how far an appellate court may go in reconstructing what a jury would have done.

Argued Oct. 6, 2026
Wisconsin Supreme Court
No. 2024AP2368-CR
Reviewing 2025 WI App 53
8 hrs
Total deliberation
3:45pm
The note the ruling rests on
20
Words in that note
1
Prong the State petitioned on
I

Overview

The Wisconsin Supreme Court heard argument on October 6, 2026, in a case that asks how far an appellate court may go in reconstructing what a jury would have done. Samuel Osornio was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide for delivering the heroin that killed his buyer. His trial lawyers did not ask for the instruction telling jurors that the separately charged heroin-delivery count was a lesser-included offense until deliberations were nearly seven hours old.

The court of appeals ordered a new trial, reasoning largely from a single mid-afternoon jury note that a properly instructed jury could well have stopped at the lesser count.1 The State asks the Court to reverse. Beneath the familiar ineffective-assistance framework sits a methodology question with reach well beyond this case: whether Strickland prejudice may rest on an inference about what was happening inside the jury room.

II

What You Should Know

Five things to carry into the decision

  • The Court is reviewing a published court of appeals decision that granted a new trial for ineffective assistance of counsel. The State petitioned on the prejudice prong alone; it assumes deficient performance for argument’s sake but does not concede it.1
  • Osornio was tried on two counts that share the same three elements — delivery, heroin, knowledge. Reckless homicide adds two more: the victim used the heroin, and it caused her death. The jury was told to treat the counts as separate crimes, not as greater and lesser offenses.
  • At about 3:45 p.m., the jury reported a conclusion on the delivery count, no agreement on the homicide count, and asked how to proceed. The court gave an Allen instruction. A tailored lesser-included instruction followed at about 7:16 p.m., and guilty verdicts on both counts came an hour later.
  • The State argues the jury was always free to convict on delivery alone, every instruction it received was legally correct, and four more hours of deliberation show a jury that had not finished its work. Osornio argues the note was unambiguous and the causation evidence was closely contested.
  • Several justices pressed both sides on whether there was any deficient performance at all — an issue the State did not bring to the Court — and on how a defendant is prejudiced by the late arrival of an instruction he may have had no right to demand.
III

What the Note Proves

Both sides read the same twenty words. They disagree about whether a court may build a prejudice finding on them.

The State

Prejudice is measured against legal entitlement

Osornio lost nothing to which he was entitled, because the jury could always have convicted on delivery alone. His theory works only if a jury holding the lesser-included instruction at 3:45 would have used it to stop deliberating early rather than make every reasonable effort on the homicide count — the lawless decision maker Strickland tells courts to disregard.

Advantage: observable conduct after the note — more than half the eight hours, a request to see the text messages, unanimous verdicts within an hour of the modified instruction. Vulnerability: its request to declare Wis JI–Criminal 112 incompatible with § 939.65 reaches past the petition.
Osornio

The instructions told the jury the opposite

The “separate crime” instruction directed jurors to do the reverse of what the lesser-included framework requires, and the jury never heard the directive that it could not convict of both. The causation evidence was closely contested.

Advantage: the note is unambiguous on its face. Vulnerability: Justice Crawford observed that the court of appeals placed no weight on the form of the instruction eventually given — two different theories of prejudice.
IV

What Happened

Every element of the delivery count is also an element of the homicide count, so the delivery count is an included crime. No one caught that at the instruction conference. Click any step for detail.

Feb. 2020

The sale, and the death

Osornio sold heroin to A.B. in a Portage parking lot; A.B. died the following day from the combined effects of heroin and alcohol.

Read more
Charged

Two counts, treated as separate

First-degree reckless homicide by delivery, Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a), and, as a separate count, delivery of three grams or less of heroin, § 961.41(1)(d)1. The jury received the standard multi-count instruction.

Read more
12:30 p.m.

Deliberations begin

On the day of trial.

Read more
3:45 p.m.

The note

“We have a conclusion on Count Two. We cannot come to an agreement on Count One. How should we proceed?” Judge Todd J. Hepler responded with the Allen instruction, Wis JI–Criminal 520.

Read more
7:16 p.m.

The lesser-included instruction, at last

In the early evening defense counsel finally raised multiplicity. With no defense objection to its wording, the court gave a modified lesser-included instruction.2

Read more
8:16 p.m.

Guilty on both counts

The court entered judgment and imposed sentence on the homicide count only.

Read more
Machner hearing

Counsel: the delay was not strategic

The circuit court denied relief, reasoning that any deficiency was cured by the instruction eventually given and that the competing accounts of what the jury would have done were “equally plausible.”

Read more
2025

Court of appeals reverses

Judge Blanchard, for a District IV panel, held the multiplicity problem was neither obscure nor difficult to research, and that the 3:45 note “can be reasonably interpreted” to show a jury deadlocked on the greater count and ready to decide the lesser. The panel granted that the State’s contrary argument had merit “as far as it goes,” then concluded the State had failed to persuade it there was not a substantial likelihood of a different result — the sentence the State now characterizes as burden-shifting.3

Read more

The Court granted review on May 20, 2026, on one issue: whether counsel’s failure to request the lesser-included instruction before deliberations “created a reasonable probability of a different result.”

V

Legal Background

Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance must prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Prejudice means a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different — a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The defendant need not show a different result was more likely than not, but the likelihood must be “substantial, not just conceivable.”

Strickland also fixes the vantage point: a reviewing court presumes the decision maker was applying the law reasonably and conscientiously, and it excludes the possibility of arbitrariness or nullification. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decision maker.4

The instructional backdrop is statutory. Section 939.65 allows the State to prosecute a single act under every provision it violates, while § 939.66 permits conviction of the crime charged or an included crime, “but not both.” Wis JI–Criminal 112 directs the jury to make every reasonable effort to agree on the greater offense first, to turn to the lesser only if it cannot agree, and never to find the defendant guilty of more than one. The multi-count instruction this jury received, Wis JI–Criminal 484, tells jurors the opposite: each count is a separate crime, and the verdict on one must not affect the verdict on another.5

VI

Zoom In

The argument turned less on doctrine than on evidence: what a court may know about a jury’s deliberations, and from what. Four exchanges framed the choice.

Counsel for the State argued that Osornio lost nothing to which he was entitled, because the jury could always have convicted on delivery alone. On that telling, his theory works only if a jury holding the lesser-included instruction at 3:45 would have used it to stop deliberating early rather than make every reasonable effort on the homicide count. That jury, the State argued, is the lawless decision maker Strickland tells courts to disregard.

The State also leaned on observable conduct after the note: more than half of the jury’s eight hours came after the Allen instruction, the jury asked to see the text messages, and it reached unanimous verdicts within an hour of the modified instruction.

Justice Crawford asked whether a note that plainly said “we are hung” would change the analysis. The State answered that it would be closer, but that the post-note deliberations still deserve confidence, because “how should we proceed” reads as a jury expecting more work.

On rebuttal, the State added that any jury deliberating eight hours plainly disagreed about something; a note confirming as much adds nothing principled.

Osornio’s counsel centered the argument on the instructions rather than the note alone, contending that the “separate crime” instruction told jurors to do the reverse of what the lesser-included framework requires, and that the jury never heard the directive that it could not convict of both.

Justice Crawford observed that the court of appeals had placed no weight on the form of the instruction eventually given. The State seized on the gap in rebuttal: two different theories of prejudice, both straining to find harm in the absence of any legal error.

Although deficient performance is not before the Court, several justices questioned it openly. Returning verdicts on both counts and sentencing on one is lawful, and Osornio’s counsel acknowledged that the instructions given were not contrary to law.

One justice asked whether it was reversible error to refuse a requested lesser-included instruction where both counts are charged and the defendant is sentenced only on the greater; the State said it was not, citing State v. Myers for the proposition that the instruction is a strategic option for either party.6

The State had the stronger hand on method. A prejudice finding built on a single twenty-word note asks courts to choose among stories about a room no one may enter, and Strickland’s presumption that juries follow instructions points the other way. But the State’s request that the Court declare the “guilty of only one” directive in Wis JI–Criminal 112 incompatible with § 939.65 is the weakest part of its presentation: § 939.66 says “but not both” in terms.

VII

What’s Next

A decision is expected before the term closes on June 30, 2027. Reversal would reinstate the homicide conviction.

Left unreached

Plain error and the interest of justice

The court of appeals did not reach Osornio’s alternative theories. Chief Justice Karofsky asked what the Court should do with them; the State urged disposal rather than remand.

Watch

Scope discipline

Whether the Court confines itself to prejudice as the petition framed it, or reaches deficient performance despite the State’s choice not to contest it.

Downstream

The pattern instruction

Any opinion may prompt revisions to Wis JI–Criminal 112 where both offenses are charged.

Endnotes & Authorities · 6 citations
  1. State v. Osornio, No. 2024AP2368-CR (Wis. argued Oct. 6, 2026) (review granted May 20, 2026), on review of State v. Osornio, 2025 WI App 53 (Blanchard, J., for a panel of Kloppenburg, P.J., Blanchard, and Taylor, JJ.), reversing Columbia Cnty. Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF223 (Hepler, J.).
  2. Osornio, 2025 WI App 53, ¶¶ 4, 46–55. The jury instructions on the counts derived from Wis JI–Criminal 1021 and 6020.
  3. Id. ¶¶ 59–73; see id. ¶ 69 (State’s argument has merit “as far as it goes”); id. ¶ 72 (circuit court found outcomes “equally plausible”). The panel did not reach plain error or the interest of justice. Id. n.12.
  4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694–95 (1984); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011); State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89; State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
  5. Wis. Stat. §§ 939.65, 939.66; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Wis JI–Criminal 112, 484, 520; Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
  6. State v. Myers (Wis. 1990). Quotations and characterizations of argument are drawn from the October 6, 2026 oral-argument recording.

More from the October 2026 sitting