Overview
Sitting in Chippewa Falls as part of its Justice on Wheels program, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard argument on October 13, 2026, in a case about the outer edge of a conservation warden’s police power. Wis. Stat. § 29.921(5) lets a certified, on-duty warden arrest anyone who commits a crime in the warden’s presence, but in the same subsection it bars wardens from conducting investigations for violations of state law outside three listed exceptions.
A DNR warden who stopped John Phelan for suspected littering ran a solo impaired-driving investigation before sheriff’s deputies arrived. In a published decision, the court of appeals held that the warden overstepped the statute, suppressed the fruits of that investigation, and reversed Phelan’s convictions.1 The State asks the Court to reverse on three independent grounds. The case poses two questions that reach well past one roadside stop: what a limited grant of arrest power carries with it, and whether courts may suppress evidence for a statutory violation when the legislature never said they could.
What You Should Know
Five things to carry into the decision
- The Court is reviewing a published decision holding that a DNR warden exceeded § 29.921(5) by administering field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test and questioning a driver before deputies arrived.1
- No one alleges a Fourth Amendment violation. Phelan concedes the littering stop was lawful, and the court of appeals held that the warden had probable cause to arrest for marijuana possession.
- The State offers three independent grounds: the arrest power carries the tasks needed to exercise it; suppression is not a remedy for this statute; and any error was harmless.
- Phelan argues the statute draws a deliberate line — arrest, deliver, and testify — and that suppression is the only remedy that gives the investigation bar any force in a criminal case.
- Justices pressed both sides on where arresting ends and investigating begins, and on whether the State forfeited its remedy and harmless-error arguments by not developing them in the court of appeals.
Where Arresting Ends
The subsection grants arrest power and withholds investigative power in the same breath. The parties divide on what the grant carries with it.
Arrest power implies the tasks to exercise it
A grant of arrest power implies the tasks needed to exercise it reasonably — questions, securing evidence, a search incident to arrest. The bar reaches only a formal inquiry into violations outside the warden’s presence, such as a warden building an auto-theft or election-fraud case on his own initiative.
The statute draws a deliberate line
Arrest, deliver, testify. No questions about marijuana use, no seizure of evidence. Suppression is the only remedy that gives the investigation bar any force in a criminal case.
What Happened
The warden later concluded that Phelan had not littered at all. Click any step for detail.
The stop near Lake Wisconsin
DNR conservation warden Ryan Volenberg believed he saw Phelan toss a can on land the department does not supervise. He followed the truck, watched it cross the center line and the fog line repeatedly, and stopped it in Columbia County.
Probable cause arrives
He smelled burnt marijuana and saw bloodshot, glassy eyes and slow, slurred speech.
A solo investigation
He asked Phelan out of the truck and, alone, administered three field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test and questioned him until Phelan admitted possessing marijuana and using it earlier that day.2
Columbia County arrives
A drug recognition evaluation followed, a deputy made the arrest, and a consented blood draw showed THC.
Acquitted of OWI, convicted on two counts
Circuit Judge W. Andrew Voigt denied suppression. A jury acquitted Phelan of operating while intoxicated but convicted him of operating with a restricted controlled substance in his blood and of possessing drug paraphernalia.
Court of appeals reverses
Judge Blanchard, for a unanimous District IV panel, held the warden could lawfully stop Phelan and detain him on probable cause of marijuana possession — but that asking him out of the truck began a “solo investigation of suspected impaired driving” the statute forbids. The court suppressed the field tests, the breath test, and Phelan’s statements to the warden; left the deputies’ evidence untouched; and reversed because the State had not developed a harmless-error argument.3
Review granted
By the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Legal Background
Every DNR warden holds limited enforcement authority under § 29.921(1), including the power to stop vehicles for listed violations such as littering. Subsection (5) adds a narrower set of powers for wardens certified as law enforcement officers. On duty and in uniform or displaying credentials, such a warden may assist another agency, arrest on a felony warrant, or arrest a person who commits a crime in the warden’s presence. After a warrantless arrest made without another agency present, the warden must deliver the person to the local sheriff or police chief.
The subsection then provides that a warden may not conduct investigations for violations of state law except as authorized by §§ 23.11(4), 29.924(1), and 41.41(12) — exceptions tied to DNR-managed land and the department’s own subject matter. Impaired driving on a county road falls within none of them.4
The remedy question turns on State v. Popenhagen (2008), which held that a circuit court has discretion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a statute that does not itself require suppression, guided by the statute’s objectives. Popenhagen found that remedy in statutory text authorizing motions to quash or limit subpoenas. The court of appeals read it more broadly, reasoning that the investigation bar would be meaningless without suppression and drawing on the Nardone line of federal statutory-suppression cases.5
The harmless-error question turns on Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2), which the Court has treated as a directive that binds reviewing courts even when the parties do not invoke it.
Zoom In
The argument resolved into three fault lines, and the bench probed each one.
The State argued that a grant of arrest power implies the tasks needed to exercise it reasonably, and that the bar reaches only a formal inquiry into violations outside the warden’s presence. Pressed for limits, it offered a warden building an auto-theft or election-fraud case on his own initiative.
Justices noted that “formal” appears nowhere in the statute and asked why a warden who already has probable cause needs field tests at all. Phelan’s counsel drew the line tightly — no questions about marijuana use, no seizure of evidence — while conceding a protective pat-down, action in a genuine emergency, and that a sheriff’s request to continue would have brought the warden within the assistance clause.
Justice Crawford asked whether the warden was simply to let an apparently impaired driver back on the road.
The State urged the Court to decide the case on suppression alone. The statute sits in the chapter on wild animals and plants, allocates authority among agencies, and creates no right for criminal defendants; any remedy belongs to the sheriff’s office or the employment relationship.
Justices answered with Popenhagen’s broad language and asked what meaning the bar retains if every unlawfully gathered piece of evidence comes in. Phelan relied on Popenhagen and on the Court’s void-authority reasoning in State v. Hess. One justice pressed him for any text showing the legislature meant to confer a right on defendants weighty enough to exclude evidence of guilt; he pointed to the structure of the grant and its carve-out.6
A justice asked why the State raised its remedy and harmless-error arguments for the first time in this Court. The State answered that Phelan had sought suppression of everything below, that a published decision should not stand on forfeiture, and that harmless-error review is mandatory.
Phelan countered that forfeiture applies first.
The methodological tension is the real story. A strict textual reading of the investigation bar favors Phelan; textual skepticism of remedies the legislature never wrote favors the State. Justices floated an exit — assume a violation, hold suppression unavailable, and leave the line-drawing for another case. The State embraced it. One justice warned, pointing to the DNR’s amicus brief, that such a ruling would leave wardens with no guidance at all.
What’s Next
A decision is expected by the end of the term next summer. Watch three things.
Does the Court draw the line?
Between arresting and investigating — or deliberately avoid it.
Does Popenhagen narrow?
A holding limiting the discretionary remedy for statutory violations would reach well beyond wardens to any statute allocating authority among officers.
Is harmless-error review a duty?
Confirming that courts must perform it unprompted would have consequences for criminal appeals generally.
The practical stakes are greatest in rural counties, where wardens are often the nearest officers on the road — and the Legislature remains free to widen or narrow the bar.
Endnotes & Authorities · 6 citations
- State v. Phelan, 2025 WI App 57 (Blanchard, J., for a panel of Graham, P.J., and Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.), review granted (Wis. Apr. 22, 2026).
- Id. ¶¶ 10–22 & n.5.
- Id. ¶¶ 36, 43, 57–60, 71, 81–83, 89–91; State v. Phelan, No. 2015CF467 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Columbia Cnty.).
- Wis. Stat. § 29.921(1), (5); Phelan, 2025 WI App 57, ¶¶ 39–40, 62 n.14.
- State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶ 68, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611; Phelan, 2025 WI App 57, ¶¶ 84–88; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.
- State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568; see also State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787.