A native of the Milwaukee area, Justice Brian Hagedorn was elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in April 2019. Prior to that, he was a judge on the Court of Appeals, having been appointed in 2015 and elected in 2017. Prior to his judicial service, Justice Hagedorn served for almost five years as Chief Legal Counsel to Governor Scott Walker, as an Assistant Attorney General at the Wisconsin Department of Justice, as a law clerk for Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman, and as an attorney in private practice at one of Milwaukee's largest law firms. Prior to law school, Justice Hagedorn worked in business for three years. To read his full biography, click here.
Brian Hagedorn is a justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where he has served since August 2019. He is a native of the Milwaukee area.
Before joining the Supreme Court, Hagedorn served on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals — appointed in 2015 and elected in 2017. Earlier in his career, he worked for nearly five years as Chief Legal Counsel to Governor Scott Walker, as an Assistant Attorney General with the Wisconsin Department of Justice, as a law clerk for Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman, and as an attorney in private practice at one of Milwaukee's largest law firms.
Hagedorn was elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in April 2019 in one of the closest statewide judicial races in state history. His ten-year term runs through 2029.
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Justice Hagedorn served as the court's most frequent bridge-builder during the 2024–25 term, often writing for unanimous or broad majorities. His method emphasizes textualism, originalism, and narrow holdings: in Kaul v. Wisconsin State Legislature he consulted an 1850 law dictionary to define "execute," and in Halter v. WIAA he resolved the case on certiorari grounds rather than reaching the broader Fourteenth Amendment state-actor question. Where possible, he distinguishes precedent rather than overruling it—his treatment of SEIU v. Vos in Kaul narrowed rather than discarded the prior case. His outcomes do not track a single political direction: he applied the same textualist discipline in striking a legislative settlement veto in Kaul and in upholding Act 10's statutory framework in SEIU Healthcare.
“The governor takes the collection of letters, numbers, and punctuation marks he receives from the legislature, crosses out whatever he pleases, and—presto!—out comes a new law never considered or passed by the legislature at all.”
“This decision does not derive from a neutral application of the law; it does not even pass the smell test.”
“The answer must be found in the text of the order itself. This means litigants and courts should not ordinarily resort to transcripts or other portions of the record to determine when an order is final; they should focus on what the written order says.”
“It is the ‘solemn obligation of the judiciary to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature.’”
“The legislature passes a bill in both houses and sends it to the governor. The governor then takes the collection of letters, numbers, and punctuation marks he receives from the legislature, crosses out whatever he pleases, and—presto!—out comes a new law never considered or passed by the legislature at all. And there you have it—a governor who can propose and enact law all on his own.”
“What the constitution calls the power to 'approve in whole or in part' has transformed into the monarchical authority of one person to create brand new laws from scratch. Instead of reading what the bills actually say, and construing the partial veto power accordingly, this court treats bills presented to the governor as simply a set of alphanumeric ingredients from which the governor can cook up whatever he pleases.”
“The governor has no power to unilaterally enact laws that were never passed by the legislature, and we should say so. It is not groundbreaking to recognize that the legislature is vested with lawmaking authority, and the executive branch is not, even if this court has ignored that for some time.”
“Lest the significance be missed, this means that if a law has been enacted, it has occurred as an act of the people through their elected representatives in the assembly and senate. Whatever becomes law must be the result of the will and action of the legislature.”
“The majority sidesteps this straightforward application of the law by ignoring what the Order actually says. Nowhere in the majority will you find an interpretation of Finding 17. It barely even mentions it. Instead of wrestling with the text, the majority focuses on a heretofore unrecognized inquiry.”
“Our cases require us to focus on the text of the order to determine its finality. The text of this Order at least arguably leaves the issue of overtrial as a matter of ongoing litigation.”
“The majority fairly summarizes the law, but then fails to follow it in this case. In so doing, it risks adding more confusion to an area of the law that can ensnare even the most seasoned of litigators.”
“Our cases impose a high standard for clarity about the finality of circuit court orders, buttressed by our mandate that final orders say they are such on their face. Our rules should be straightforward; the obligation to appeal on a timely basis should not be a procedural trap for litigants or courts.”