Behind the Bench: How Wisconsin’s Court of Appeals Judges Actually Decide

Executive Summary

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals is the workhorse of the state's judiciary. It resolves all appeals that never reach the Supreme Court (which is the vast majority of appeals). Its published opinions establish binding precedent throughout Wisconsin, dictating the interpretation of legislative statutes, outlining the boundaries of administrative agency authority, and defining the scope of constitutional protections for millions of citizens. Despite its profound influence on the trajectory of Wisconsin law, the Court of Appeals is frequently overshadowed by the high-profile ideological battles that characterize the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Until now, no organization has attempted a systematic, opinion-by-opinion review of the court's work. This report changes that. The Institute for Reforming Government reviewed every published opinion issued by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals between January 2024 and December 2025—113 opinions across all four appellate districts. Each opinion was evaluated on six standards of judicial reasoning: fidelity to binding precedent, respect for legislative authority and constitutional boundaries, adherence to textualist and originalist methods of interpretation, judicial restraint, protection of individual liberty, and quality of legal craft and clarity. The analysis covers 16 judges sitting in Districts I through IV.

What We Found

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals is, for the most part, a competent and professional institution. The overwhelming majority of published opinions across all four districts reflect sound legal reasoning, faithful application of binding Supreme Court precedent, and appropriate restraint. Most three-judge panels reached unanimous decisions, and the quality of written analysis was generally consistent within and across districts.

That said, several important patterns emerged from the analysis:

• District II (Waukesha) produced the most significant internal divisions. Judge Lisa Neubauer dissented in five of the district's most consequential opinions—covering administrative law, separation of powers, election law, and employment discrimination—consistently siding against the majority position on questions involving legislative authority, agency deference, and statutory interpretation. In several of these cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals majority, sometimes unanimously. Neubauer's dissent pattern is the most distinct voting record of any judge in the four-district system.
• District III (Wausau) was the most cohesive. Judges Stark, Hruz, and Gill produced no dissents during the entire evaluation period. Their opinions reflect consistent methodology and a shared approach to precedent and statutory interpretation.
• District IV (Madison) was fully unanimous but drew Supreme Court scrutiny. All five District IV judges agreed on every published opinion, but the Supreme Court reversed the district in State v. Ramirez (5-2) on a speedy trial question and signaled disagreement with the district's approach in Hubbard v. Neuman, where Justices Ziegler and Grassl Bradley dissented from the Court's affirmance.
• District I (Milwaukee) had the smallest published docket and produced one notable dissent: Chief Judge White's dissent in Children's Hospital v. Wauwatosa, where she departed from the majority's textualist analysis of a property tax exemption statute.

Structural Concerns

Beyond the individual opinions, the review identified structural features of the Court of Appeals that affect the quality and consistency of Wisconsin appellate justice:

• Geographic case concentration creates uneven dockets. District I handles a disproportionate share of criminal and commercial appeals originating in Milwaukee County. District IV handles the state's most significant separation-of-powers and administrative law disputes because state agencies are headquartered in Dane County.
• The absence of statewide panel randomization invites forum shopping. Unlike the federal circuit courts, where cases are randomly assigned to panels drawn from the full roster of active judges, Wisconsin appellate judges sit only within their geographic district. Litigants who understand the ideological composition of each district can—and do—structure their filings to land in the district most favorable to their position.
• The first-to-publish rule creates a race to set statewide precedent. Because one district's published opinion binds all other districts, a panel that publishes first on a novel question effectively sets the law for the entire state. This creates a perverse incentive to rush publication when similar appeals are pending in multiple districts rather than engage in the kind of deliberate analysis that difficult questions deserve.

Key Takeaways & Structural Insights

1. The Most Significant Ideological Divisions Occurred in District II (Waukesha)

Here, the bench regularly splintered. Presiding Judge Lisa Neubauer repeatedly dissented from her conservative colleagues, forging a distinct progressive jurisprudence that frequently clashed with the textualist majorities authored by Judges Mark Gundrum, Shelley Grogan, and Maria Lazar. These fault lines prove that the philosophical disposition of the jurist remains paramount when the text is fiercely contested. Meaningful differences emerge in the hardest cases. The facade of a monolithic appellate bench falls away, revealing starkly divergent methodologies.

2. District IV Has Disproportionate Judges Relative to Its Caseload

District IV operates with five judges yet handles a published docket comparable in size to districts with three or four judges. This structural imbalance raises questions about resource allocation and whether the current district boundaries reflect the actual distribution of appellate workload.

3. District Composition Matters More Than Most People Realize

Wisconsin's appellate architecture treats the four districts as interchangeable equivalents. This is a profound fiction. Because cases are tethered to the circuit courts of their origin, the four appellate districts receive fundamentally different types of cases based entirely on geography.

• District I (Milwaukee) manages a heavy urban criminal and complex commercial docket, acting as a highly selective filter for constitutional procedure.
• District II (Waukesha) serves as the doctrinal battleground for significant administrative overreach, separation of powers, and election law cases.
• District III (Wausau) dominates the jurisprudence of the heartland, with a concentrated docket of environmental, property, and municipal disputes.
• District IV (Madison), seated in the state capital, handles the state's most significant government-structure and executive agency cases.

Cross-district comparison of judicial performance is inherently misleading without accounting for these jurisdictional realities. A judge in Wausau evaluates a fundamentally different subset of the law than a judge in Milwaukee.

4. The Supreme Court Reversed District II Opinions More Frequently Than Any Other District

Of the four districts, District II produced the most Supreme Court interactions during the evaluation period. The Supreme Court reversed District II opinions in WMC v. DNR, Kaul v. Legislature, Halter v. WIAA, and Oconomowoc v. Cota. In each case, Judge Neubauer had dissented from the Court of Appeals majority—a pattern warranting close attention as its composition evolves.

To the untrained eye, these reversals might suggest appellate error. Through the lens of constitutional fidelity, they signal precisely the opposite. The Supreme Court's progressive majority approaches the law from a fundamentally different, activist posture compared to District II's textualist, conservative majority. Accordingly, reversals by a 5-2 progressive majority should be considered a badge of honor—not a flaw.

When Judges Grogan, Gundrum, and Lazar faithfully applied original public meaning and refused to defer to administrative overreach, they fulfilled their constitutional oath. That the progressive Supreme Court subsequently reversed their rulings reflects the high court's ideological drift, not the appellate panel's legal acumen. Conversely, Judge Neubauer's repeated alignment with the progressive Supreme Court majority highlights an activist methodology deeply at odds with the conservative restraint required of an intermediate jurist.

5. The Court of Appeals Is Largely Doing Its Job

Before diagnosing the structural ailments of the appellate bench, one must acknowledge its foundational stability. The Court of Appeals is largely doing its job. Across more than one hundred published opinions spanning the evaluation period, most of the docket reflects a faithful application of binding Supreme Court precedent. In routine matters, the sixteen jurists demonstrate competent statutory interpretation under the Kalal framework and an appropriate exercise of judicial restraint. They correct evidentiary errors, enforce pleading standards, and resolve commercial disputes with methodical precision. The machinery of justice operates as designed.

6. The Court of Appeals Should Have More Flexibility to Revisit Wrongly Decided Precedent

Under the current framework, a published Court of Appeals opinion binds all four districts until the Supreme Court overrules it. If the first district to publish on a novel question gets the analysis wrong, every other district is locked into following that error. The Court of Appeals should have a mechanism to reconsider and correct its own published precedent without requiring Supreme Court intervention—analogous to the federal circuits' en banc review.

7. Structural Reform Deserves Serious Consideration

The geographic concentration of case types, the absence of statewide panel randomization, and the first-to-publish binding precedent rule all create structural pressures that affect the quality and consistency of Wisconsin appellate law. These are not problems that can be solved by evaluating individual judges—they require institutional reform of the kind IRG has previously proposed in Structural Reform of Judicial Selection in Wisconsin.

8. Districts Should Evaluate Their Practices vis-à-vis Their Peers

From a practitioner perspective, different districts approach different parts of the judicial process uniquely. Some districts are more inclined to publish their opinions, while others publish more rarely. Some prefer oral argument; others shy away from it. Because some districts publish more, they may also have longer wait times to decision. Some of this may reflect the districts' unique dockets—the criminal cases in District I, for instance, may present fewer novel questions worthy of publication than the governmental cases in District IV.

Why the Appellate Court Report Is Qualitative

Established in 1978 to relieve the Supreme Court's caseload, the Court of Appeals sits in four geographic districts and hears appeals from circuit courts within each district. Its primary function is error correction: determining whether the circuit court correctly applied the law. Its published opinions perform a secondary function—clarifying and developing the law within bounds set by the Supreme Court—and are binding precedent statewide until the Supreme Court overrules them.

Appellate judges are bound, far more tightly than Supreme Court justices, by binding precedent. Under Cook v. Cook, only the Supreme Court may modify or overrule published Court of Appeals precedent. Moreover, three-judge panels obscure individual authorship. At the Supreme Court, separate writings make individual positions visible; at the Court of Appeals, dissents are rare and panels routinely issue unanimous opinions that paper over internal disagreement.

Unlike the Supreme Court, which exercises near-total discretion over certiorari, the Court of Appeals takes every appeal properly filed and venued. Its dockets are assigned, not selected. Supreme Court review is rare—historically granted in fewer than ten percent of petitions, and in recent terms closer to two to four percent.

Therefore, what readers need to know is qualitative:

• Does the judge's reasoning adhere to statutory text?
• Does it engage binding precedent faithfully?
• Does it decide only what the case requires?

The Appellate Report Card exists to answer those questions in structured narrative profiles and case-by-case analysis.

Analytical Framework—Six Standards

The IRG Court Watch team evaluated all published opinions across six standards of judicial reasoning. For each opinion we asked the following questions across those six standards:

1. Adherence to Precedent

This standard measures whether the opinion identifies and applies the controlling Wisconsin Supreme Court authority on the question presented. The reference points are external and verifiable: the Cook v. Cook precedent hierarchy; the existence of on-point Wisconsin Supreme Court holdings; whether contrary authority cited in the briefs was addressed or ignored. An opinion that cites controlling authority, applies it to the facts, and explains any distinctions from factually similar cases satisfies this standard; in contrast, an opinion that omits on-point Supreme Court authority, misstates the holding of a cited case, or distinguishes binding precedent on grounds the precedent itself forecloses is unsatisfactory.

Where binding precedent compels a result that the panel considers unsound, the standard credits panels that apply the precedent and flags the issue for Supreme Court reconsideration through concurrence or certification under § 809.61.

2. Legislative Deference

This standard measures whether the opinion treats the legislature's enacted text as the operative legal instrument. The reference points are the statutory language itself and the de novo standard of review Tetra Tech restored. An opinion satisfies this standard when it (a) applies de novo review to agency legal interpretations rather than deferring under the great-weight or due-weight frameworks—Wisconsin's Chevron analogues—that Tetra Tech abandoned; (b) holds agencies to the procedural requirements of any rulemaking authority the legislature delegated; and (c) decides the case on the words the legislature enacted without reading additional words in or existing words out.

3. Textualism and Statutory Fidelity

This standard measures whether the opinion applies the Kalal plain-meaning framework as the Wisconsin Supreme Court requires. Kalal is not a reviewer preference; it is binding Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent that prescribes a specific analytical sequence. An opinion satisfies this standard when it begins with the statutory language, engages statutory structure and recognized canons of construction, and relies on extrinsic sources only after a threshold finding of ambiguity. Where text is genuinely ambiguous, the opinion must apply the applicable substantive canon (e.g., rule of lenity in criminal matters, strict construction of tax exemptions) before resorting to legislative history.

4. Judicial Restraint and Role Fidelity

This standard measures whether the opinion decides what the parties asked the court to decide, and no more. The reference points are the question presented on appeal, the grounds briefed by the parties, and the institutional role of an intermediate appellate court under Cook v. Cook. An opinion satisfies this standard when it resolves the case on the narrowest available ground, avoids unnecessary dicta to the disposition, and declines to reach constitutional questions where sub-constitutional grounds are adequate.

5. Individual Liberty

This standard measures whether the opinion applies the scrutiny that the relevant constitutional provision demands. The reference points are the text of the specific constitutional protection at issue—under the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution, or both—and the established doctrinal framework governing it. An opinion satisfies this standard when it identifies the applicable constitutional test, applies the level of scrutiny that test requires, and does not substitute a deferential posture toward government action where the Constitution requires meaningful review.

6. Craft and Clarity

This standard measures whether the opinion is written so that its operative legal rule can be identified and applied by the audience that will rely on it: circuit court judges bound by the holding, practicing attorneys advising clients, and informed citizens navigating Wisconsin law. An opinion satisfies this standard when the holding is clearly stated, the reasoning is organized so that each step is identifiable, and the disposition follows logically from the analysis.

District I—Milwaukee

District I, headquartered in Milwaukee, is the state's most urban appellate district. It handles appeals primarily from Milwaukee County and surrounding areas, producing a docket weighted toward criminal appeals, commercial disputes, and family law. During the evaluation period, District I produced 15 published opinions—the smallest published docket of any district.

Panel Composition. District I's panel during the evaluation period consisted of Chief Judge Maxine A. White, Presiding Judge M. Joseph Donald, Judge Sara J. Geenen, and Judge Pedro A. Colón. The four judges rotated across three-judge panels, with most opinions decided unanimously.

Analytical Overview. District I's published opinions during the evaluation period were competent but largely unremarkable. The small number of published cases limited the opportunity for significant doctrinal development. Most opinions involved straightforward application of established precedent to fact-specific disputes.

Judge Pedro A. Colón

District I—Milwaukee

Judge Colón, appointed by Governor Tony Evers in 2023, is a former Wisconsin state legislator (1999–2010) and the first Latino ever elected to the Wisconsin Legislature. His background includes service on the Joint Committee on Finance and as a commissioner for the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District.

Colón authored the majority in Children's Hospital v. Wauwatosa, declining to expand the property tax exemption beyond the "used exclusively" text the legislature enacted; he correctly applied the statutory framework, grounded the disposition in a separation-of-powers point that exemption lines are the legislature's to draw, and drew a well-reasoned dissent from Chief Judge White. In Hess v. WEC, Colón traced a clean statutory chain—from § 8.07's rulemaking delegation through EL 2.05(5) to § 8.30(1)(a)—to uphold WEC's substantial-compliance treatment of nomination papers, drawing a precise textualist distinction between "shall" as a content mandate versus a format mandate. His Hess analysis was later cited approvingly by Justice R.G. Bradley's dissent in Brown v. WEC (2025 WI 5).

Judge M. Joseph Donald

District I—Milwaukee

Judge Donald, appointed by Governor Evers in 2019 and serving as Deputy Chief Judge, participated in the majority of District I's published opinions during the evaluation period but authored few. He consistently joined well-reasoned majorities without separate writing, reflecting a disciplined judicial temperament across criminal, civil, and administrative law cases. Donald provided a reliable second or third vote for the district's most text-bound opinions—including Lorbiecki v. Pabst—tracking District I's generally competent and restrained approach to appellate review.

Judge Sara J. Geenen

District I—Milwaukee

Judge Geenen, elected in 2023, joined the court with a background in labor and employment law and prior Democratic political activity—including field organizing for Governor Jim Doyle's 2002 gubernatorial campaign and a 2014 run in the Democratic primary for the 19th Assembly District.

In State v. Kenyon, Geenen reconciled a complex chain of criminal law precedents—Batchelder, Cissell, Karpinski, and Lindsey—with precision and sophisticated analysis, acknowledging the structural trial-penalty concern without overreaching to resolve it. In State v. Adams, she articulated a clear doctrinal framework for juvenile discovery rights, correctly applying the Kleser standard as the governing test.

Judge Maxine White

District I—Milwaukee

Chief Judge White, appointed by Governor Tony Evers in 2020, serves as the administrative head of the entire Court of Appeals system.

White authored Lorbiecki v. Pabst, a complex multi-issue appeal involving statutory interpretation and common-law doctrine, correctly interpreting § 895.043(6) to capture total recoverable damages and delivering a first-impression reading that nearly doubled the judgment to $13.42M—earning the district's highest marks for precedent fidelity and textual analysis. Her dissent in Children's Hospital v. Wauwatosa, by contrast, departed from the majority's textualist approach, arguing for a broader reading of "used exclusively" in the property tax exemption statute. The dissent's central proposition—that a construction phase satisfies an "exclusive use" requirement—relied on purposivist reasoning that prioritized the statute's perceived intent over its enacted language.

Notable District I Opinions

State v. J.D.B. (2025 WI App 5), rev'd, 2026 WI 5

A published District I opinion addressing involuntary medication of adult criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial under the Sell framework. Applying that framework to a defendant charged with battery to a law enforcement officer following a mental-health crisis, the panel reversed the circuit court's involuntary medication order, concluding that none of the four Sell factors had been established and that the circuit court's findings under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) were clearly erroneous. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed on review.

Lorbiecki v. Pabst (2024 WI App 33), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 2026 WI 12

Chief Judge White's strongest authored opinion: a complex, multi-issue appeal involving asbestos mesothelioma wrongful death under the safe place statute resolved unanimously. Affirmed liability on all grounds. On cross-appeal, delivered a first-impression interpretation of § 895.043(6), holding "compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiff" means total recoverable damages from all parties—not the defendant's apportioned share—nearly doubling the judgment to $13.42M. Clean textualism, strong precedent fidelity, appropriate deference to jury fact-finding.

Children's Hospital of Wisconsin v. City of Wauwatosa (2025 WI App 43)

The most analytically significant District I opinion. Colón's majority held that Family Hospital's "readying rule" applies only to fully constructed buildings in final preparation for exempt use—not to a building 14% complete at assessment. The analysis rested on § 70.11(4m)'s "used exclusively" text, the presumption against exemption, and a separation-of-powers point that exemption lines are the legislature's to draw. Chief Judge White dissented, arguing that construction is an indispensable prerequisite to exempt use and should satisfy the readying rule where the completed building's exemption is undisputed.

Hess v. WEC (2024 WI App 46)

Judge Colón's election law opinion upholding WEC's acceptance of nomination papers with photocopying defects under the substantial compliance standard. Read § 5.06(8) standing by its plain text, refusing to graft a candidate-only limitation the legislature never wrote—an analysis later cited approvingly by Justice R.G. Bradley's dissent in Brown v. WEC (2025 WI 5).

District II—Waukesha

District II, headquartered in Waukesha, is the most dynamic and closely watched appellate district in Wisconsin. Covering the suburban collar counties around Milwaukee, District II produced the largest and most diverse docket of published opinions (42 opinions) during the evaluation period. It serves as the primary battleground for the state's most significant disputes regarding administrative authority, environmental regulation, and the separation of powers.

Panel Composition. District II's panel consisted of Presiding Judge Mark D. Gundrum (succeeded by Judge Lisa S. Neubauer as presiding judge in August 2025), Judge Neubauer, Judge Shelley A. Grogan, and Judge Maria Lazar.

The Defining Pattern: Judge Neubauer's Dissents

The defining jurisprudential feature of District II is the pronounced and highly consistent dissent pattern of Judge Neubauer. Across the evaluation period, Neubauer filed dissents in five of the district's most consequential published opinions, arising out of five underlying controversies: WMC v. DNR, Halter v. WIAA, Oconomowoc v. Cota, Braun v. Vote.org, and the two statutory companions in the Attorney General settlement-authority litigation—Kaul v. Legislature, 2025 WI App 3 (§ 165.08), and Legislature v. Kaul, 2025 WI App 2 (§ 165.10). In each instance, Neubauer broke from the panel majority—authored by Lazar in three instances, Grogan in two, and Gundrum in one—on questions involving legislative authority, agency deference, and statutory interpretation.

This pattern is critical because the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which shifted to a new majority in 2023, has repeatedly intervened to reverse District II majorities and adopt Neubauer's dissenting rationale. In WMC v. DNR, Judge Grogan authored a majority opinion restricting the Department of Natural Resources, ruling that the agency had to promulgate formal administrative rules identifying specific quantities of "hazardous substances" before enforcing the Spills Law against PFAS contamination via the Voluntary Party Liability Exemption (VPLE) program. Neubauer dissented, arguing that the majority misread the statutory enforcement framework and unlawfully constrained the executive branch's case-by-case enforcement discretion. The Supreme Court reversed the majority 5-2 in 2025 WI 26, adopting Neubauer's rationale.

Similarly, in Kaul v. Legislature, 2025 WI App 3, Judge Lazar authored a majority opinion in a high-stakes separation-of-powers case rejecting the Attorney General's as-applied constitutional challenge to Wis. Stat. § 165.08(1). Neubauer again dissented, contending that settlement of civil enforcement actions is core executive power and that conditioning it on legislative committee approval violates the separation of powers. In 2025 WI 23, the Supreme Court unanimously (7-0) reversed.

The 7-0 unanimity in Kaul v. Legislature cannot be explained as ideological realignment. When Ziegler, R.G. Bradley, and Hagedorn join Protasiewicz, Karofsky, Dallet, and A.W. Bradley in reversing a District II majority, the deficiency is methodological, not ideological.

The companion case, Legislature v. Kaul, 2025 WI App 2, addressed whether § 165.10 requires the DOJ to deposit all settlement proceeds into the General Purpose Revenue account. Lazar again authored; Neubauer again dissented, arguing that the majority had worked backward from perceived legislative purpose rather than forward from the "unless otherwise specifically provided by law" clause of § 20.906(1). The Supreme Court granted review.

This pattern is significant for several reasons. First, it reveals a consistent methodological divide within District II on questions of legislative authority, agency power, and statutory interpretation—a divide in which Neubauer has repeatedly anchored the textualist position against majorities that privilege legislative purpose or expansive readings of legislative oversight. Second, the majority of Neubauer's dissents reviewed by the Supreme Court have been adopted on reversal. In WMC v. DNR, Halter v. WIAA (2025 WI 10), and Oconomowoc v. Cota (2025 WI 11), the Supreme Court reversed 5-2, with Chief Justice Ziegler and Justice R.G. Bradley consistently dissenting from the reversals.

Judge Shelley A. Grogan

District II—Waukesha

Judge Grogan, who reached the court by defeating an incumbent in 2021, consistently demands explicit legislative delegations of power before allowing executive agencies to act, reflecting a strict separation-of-powers methodology.

Grogan authored the majority in WMC v. DNR, demanding formal rulemaking before the Department of Natural Resources could enforce the Spills Law against PFAS contamination via the Voluntary Party Liability Exemption program—a stance grounded in strict separation of powers. Though reversed 5-2 by the Supreme Court in 2025 WI 26, Chief Justice Ziegler and Justice R.G. Bradley dissented from the reversal, preserving her textualist reading as the minority position on the state's highest court. In State v. West, Grogan authored Wisconsin's first published interpretation of the drug-aggregation statute, § 971.365(1)(b), rejecting a surplusage-heavy reading. Her work in Abby Windows v. LIRC and US Cellular v. Fond du Lac County demonstrates solid statutory-interpretation work on labor, employment, and municipal-law questions.

Judge Mark D. Gundrum

District II—Waukesha

Judge Gundrum served in the Wisconsin State Legislature representing the 84th Assembly District from 1999 to 2010 before being appointed to the Waukesha County Circuit Court in 2010 and elevated by Governor Scott Walker to the Court of Appeals, District II. He was re-elected to the court in 2025 and brings a textualist methodology deeply informed by his prior public service and an approach highly deferential to the plain text enacted by the legislature.

In State v. Larson, Gundrum transparently acknowledged an intra-district conflict with Bohannon and correctly deferred to the Supreme Court's Mace holding—a model for how an intermediate appellate court should handle its own inconsistent precedent under Cook v. Cook—while executing a meticulous structural reading of the judicial substitution statute to protect a defendant's procedural rights. His Oconomowoc v. Cota majority—while ultimately reversed—reflected a defensible plain-meaning reading of "any other offense" under § 111.32(1).

Judge Maria Lazar

District II—Waukesha

Judge Lazar, elected in 2022, built her career as a Waukesha County circuit judge and an Assistant Attorney General for the Wisconsin Department of Justice (2010–2015).

Her authored opinions reflect a consistent focus on limiting bureaucratic expansion and closely patrolling the separation of powers, though her § 165.10 construction in Legislature v. Kaul was criticized for working backward from perceived legislative purpose rather than forward from the "unless otherwise specifically provided by law" clause of § 20.906(1). Lazar also authored the companion majority in Kaul v. Legislature (§ 165.08) that the Supreme Court unanimously (7-0) reversed in 2025 WI 23, with Justice Hagedorn writing that the majority had overstated the holding of SEIU v. Vos. The cross-ideological unanimity of that reversal—Ziegler and R.G. Bradley joining the progressive majority—signals methodological rather than ideological trouble in the underlying analysis.

Judge Lisa S. Neubauer

District II—Waukesha

Judge Neubauer, appointed by Governor Jim Doyle in 2007, is the sole judge in District II who consistently dissented from the panel majority on the district's most significant cases. Across the evaluation period, Neubauer filed dissents in five of the district's most consequential published opinions—WMC v. DNR, Halter v. WIAA, Oconomowoc v. Cota, Braun v. Vote.org, and the companion settlement-authority cases Kaul v. Legislature and Legislature v. Kaul—consistently siding against majorities on questions involving legislative authority, agency deference, and statutory interpretation.

Her text-first dissenting theory in Kaul v. Legislature was adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on 7-0 reversal in 2025 WI 23, and her reading of "hazardous substance" in WMC v. DNR was adopted by the 5-2 Supreme Court majority in 2025 WI 26. In Halter v. WIAA and Oconomowoc v. Cota, the Supreme Court likewise reversed 5-2 along lines tracking her dissents. Her authored majority work—including McLaughlin v. Gaslight Pointe and BofA v. Estate of Nelson—is competent but unremarkable; the dissent methodology is what defines the profile, consistently beginning with the statutory text and building outward.

Notable District II Opinions

Oconomowoc v. Cota (2024 WI App 8)

The most analytically significant District II opinion. Gundrum's majority held that "arrest record" discrimination under the WFEA excludes civil and municipal offenses—reading "any other offense" in § 111.32(1) to mean criminal offenses only. Neubauer's dissent marshaled a comprehensive textual case: the double-"any" broadening modifier, the "includes but is not limited to" signal, a pre-enactment usage survey, and the § 134.71(5)(c) cross-reference showing the legislature knew how to limit "arrest record" when it wanted to. Oconomowoc produced the widest intra-panel disagreement in the district. The Supreme Court reversed 5-2.

Legislature v. Kaul (2025 WI App 2) & Kaul v. Legislature (2025 WI App 3)

Companion separation-of-powers cases addressing JFC control over DOJ enforcement settlements and budgetary authority. Lazar authored both; Grogan joined; Neubauer dissented in both. On § 165.08, Lazar's majority upheld JFC's approval authority over DOJ settlement of civil enforcement actions as constitutional. Neubauer dissented, arguing that settlement of civil enforcement actions is core executive power and that conditioning it on JFC approval violates the separation of powers. The Supreme Court reversed 7-0.

DRW/LWV v. WEC (2025 WI App 27)

An election law and disability rights case on absentee ballot assistance for print-disabled voters under § 6.87. A unanimous panel—Gundrum authoring, Grogan and Lazar joining—reversed a temporary injunction on procedural grounds. Footnote 6 editorialized about the legislature's institutional superiority over the judiciary. The opinion failed to engage meaningfully with the disability rights claims at stake, reversing the injunction protecting those rights without addressing the substance of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and state constitutional arguments raised: the weakest individual liberty analysis in the district portfolio.

Rabiebna v. HEAB (2025 WI App 24)

Gundrum's majority, joined by Grogan and Lazar, applied the Students for Fair Admissions strict scrutiny framework to strike down Wis. Stat. § 39.44's Minority Undergraduate Retention Grant program as a purely race-based classification. At 52 pages and 87 paragraphs, the longest opinion in the district. Strong equal protection analysis. The standing discussion is restrained; the record interrogation demonstrating that HEAB's evidence related to UW-system schools rather than the private and technical colleges covered by § 39.44 is meticulous.

WMC v. DNR (2024 WI App 18)

The PFAS enforcement case addressed whether DNR must promulgate rules before enforcing the Spills Law (§ 292) for PFAS contamination. Grogan's majority held rulemaking was required; Lazar joined. Neubauer dissented, reading the statutory definition of "hazardous substance" in § 292.01(5) as deliberately broad and fact-specific, supporting case-by-case enforcement without a rulemaking prerequisite. The opinion with the most significant real-world consequences in the district. Reversed 5-2 by the Supreme Court.

Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Ropicky (2023AP588)

A complex insurance-coverage opinion producing a rare analytical split between Grogan (majority) and Neubauer (concurrence) on the doctrinal framework for the Fungi Exclusion. Both agreed on the outcome—reversal and remand. But Grogan's majority introduced a novel distinction between an exclusion being "never triggered" and an exception reinstating coverage. Neubauer's concurrence demonstrated the distinction lacks support in Wisconsin precedent. Review granted; oral argument held February 10, 2026.

Fish v. Bevco (2024 WI App 54)

Unemployment benefits case on whether an employer's no-fault attendance policy can define "misconduct" under § 108.04(5)(e), including for illness-related and COVID-era absences. Lazar's majority held that an employee's violation of a properly adopted no-fault policy constitutes misconduct regardless of whether individual absences were for valid reasons with notice. Neubauer concurred separately, reinforcing the textual analysis with a sharper reductio ad absurdum of LIRC's interpretation.

District III—Wausau

District III, headquartered in Wausau, covers Wisconsin's northern and central counties. Its docket reflects the region's character: environmental disputes, property cases, municipal governance, and a steady stream of criminal appeals from rural jurisdictions. During the evaluation period, District III produced 26 published opinions.

Panel Composition. District III operates with a three-judge panel of Presiding Judge Lisa K. Stark, Judge Thomas M. Hruz, and Judge Gregory B. Gill, Jr. This is the only district where the same three judges sit on every case, creating the most cohesive panel in the system.

Analytical Overview. District III produced zero dissents during the entire evaluation period. The three judges agreed on every published opinion—a level of unanimity unmatched by any other district. This cohesion reflects either a shared judicial philosophy, a docket that presents fewer contested questions, or some combination of both. The quality of District III's published work is consistently strong.

Judge Gregory B. Gill, Jr.

District III—Wausau

Judge Gill was elected to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in April 2021 and took the bench that August. His résumé combines years as ADA, federal circuit clerk, and private practice with a decade on the Outagamie County Circuit Court—appointed by Governor Scott Walker in 2011, twice re-elected without opposition.

Gill authored Kohler Co. v. DNR, expertly applying the dual-track review that Tetra Tech requires for agency legal versus factual findings—de novo on legal questions, substantial evidence on factual ones—without collapsing the two inquiries. In State v. Campbell, Gill applied the Jones/Jardines trespassory test to find that a police canine's two entries into a vehicle through an open driver's side door constituted warrantless searches. His opinion in Van Oudenhoven v. DOJ construing the federal "expunged or set aside" exception reflects the same methodical textualism and disciplined use of out-of-circuit authority.

Judge Thomas M. Hruz

District III—Wausau

Judge Hruz was appointed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals by Governor Scott Walker on July 21, 2014, to succeed retiring Judge Mark Mangerson, and elected without opposition in 2016 and 2022. His credentials read as an appellate-law pedigree: clerkships with Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. and Judge John L. Coffey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; and a decade as a partner at Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols. In 2016, Governor Walker named Hruz one of three finalists to replace Justice Prosser on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

In Frankenthal v. West Bend Mutual, Hruz resolved a complex insurance-coverage dispute without reaching unnecessary broader legal questions, explicitly declining the broader grounds where narrower terms would dispose of the case. Across the district's portfolio, Hruz provided critical analytical support for the zero-dissent record.

Judge Lisa Stark

District III—Wausau

Judge Stark was elected unopposed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in April 2013, has served as Deputy Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals from 2015 to 2023, and as District III's Presiding Judge since 2015. Before the appellate bench, Stark served 13.5 years on the Eau Claire County Circuit Court (2000–2013). She has served as Dean of the Wisconsin Judicial College since 2011.

Stark authored Ricciardi v. Town of Lake, using a textbook whole-act reading of § 88.87(2) to confirm common-law preemption. In Outagamie v. MJB, Stark applied the silence canon to § 51.20(10)(b)—reading the legislature's pointed omission of the jurisdiction-preserving clause found in § 51.20(13)(g)2r. as deliberate—to protect the due-process rights of individuals facing involuntary commitment. Her Oitzinger v. Marinette Open Meetings opinion reflects the same textualist discipline, rejecting a "rational justification" gloss as grafting words onto the statute the legislature never wrote.

Notable District III Opinions

Outagamie v. MJB (2025 WI App 37)

Judge Stark's majority holding that the County's failure to file an examiner's report forty-eight hours before the final hearing, as required by § 51.20(10)(b), deprives the circuit court of competency to proceed with an involuntary commitment. The opinion's analytical centerpiece is a comparative statutory analysis: § 51.20(13)(g)2r., which governs recommitment proceedings, explicitly provides that late filing does not affect the court's jurisdiction—but § 51.20(10)(b), governing initial commitments, contains no such clause. Grounded in due process principles.

State v. Campbell (2024 WI App 17)

Judge Gill's Fourth Amendment opinion holding that a police canine's two entries into a vehicle through an open driver's side door constituted warrantless searches. Applied the Jones/Jardines trespassory test—the canine, as an instrumentality of law enforcement, physically intruded into a constitutionally protected effect—rather than relying solely on the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy framework. Gill exercised exemplary restraint by assuming without deciding whether the "instinct exception" exists in Wisconsin, then demonstrating it would fail on these facts regardless. Unanimous three-judge panel; recommended for publication. Supreme Court review granted.

Oitzinger v. Marinette (2025 WI App 19)

Stark's Open Meetings Law opinion holding that the City of Marinette violated the bargaining exemption under § 19.85(1)(e) by conducting two Council discussions entirely in closed session. Bound by Milton, the opinion reaffirmed that "require" means the government's competitive or bargaining reasons must leave no other option than to close the meeting. Rejected Marinette's proposed "rational justification" standard as grafting words onto the statute the legislature never wrote.

Van Oudenhoven v. DOJ (2024 WI App 38)

Judge Gill's opinion construing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), the "expunged or set aside" exception to the federal firearms prohibition for persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The Court held Wisconsin expungement under § 973.015 does not satisfy the federal exception because it "merely deletes the evidence of the underlying conviction from court records" without invalidating the underlying conviction. The opinion represents clean textualism, disciplined use of federal out-of-circuit authority, and rigorous statutory-structure analysis. SCOW dismissed review as improvidently granted, 4-3, leaving Judge Gill's opinion untouched and fully binding as statewide precedent.

District IV—Madison

District IV, headquartered in Madison, handles the state's most significant government-structure disputes by virtue of geography: state agencies, the legislature, and the governor's office are all located in Dane County, meaning appeals from administrative actions, separation-of-powers disputes, and regulatory challenges disproportionately flow through this district. During the evaluation period, District IV produced 30 published opinions.

Panel Composition. District IV operates with the largest judicial roster of any district: Judges Kloppenburg, Blanchard, Taylor, Graham, and Nashold all sat on panels during the evaluation period. Unlike District III's fixed three-judge panel, District IV rotates its judges across different three-judge combinations.

Analytical Overview. District IV produced no dissents during the evaluation period—every published opinion was unanimous. This cohesion is notable given the district's substantively challenging docket. Despite the unanimity, the district drew two significant Supreme Court interactions.

Judge Brian Blanchard

District IV—Madison

Judge Blanchard has served on the Court of Appeals since 2010. Before the appellate bench, he was twice elected Dane County District Attorney (2001–2010), spent seven years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois, and clerked for Judge Walter Cummings of the Seventh Circuit. He brings the distinctive pre-law background of six years as a reporter for The Miami Herald.

Blanchard participated in the most total opinions of any District IV judge during the evaluation period, with a balanced mix of authored and joined work, and was the only District IV judge to sit on both the Ramirez and Hubbard panels. In Mitchell v. Buesgen, Blanchard followed Cook v. Cook despite questioning the statutory basis of the "three-strikes" requirement in a footnote—applying the binding rule and flagging the issue for Supreme Court reconsideration rather than departing from it. In Jahimiak, he explicitly bypassed a forfeiture rationale to resolve the case on the narrowest legally sound grounds.

Judge Rachel Graham

District IV—Madison

Judge Graham was appointed by Governor Evers in 2019—his first Court of Appeals appointment. She was named Presiding Judge of District IV in August 2025, succeeding Judge Kloppenburg. After working as a special education teacher in Baton Rouge, she returned to UW Law and later clerked for Justice Ann Walsh Bradley before eight years in commercial litigation at Quarles & Brady.

Graham handled significant administrative duties as Presiding Judge while authoring opinions on eminent domain in Hanson Trust v. ATC and new-factor sentence modification in State v. Schueller. She also authored the majority in State v. Ramirez that the Supreme Court reversed 5-2 (Justice R.G. Bradley writing), concluding the Court of Appeals had erred by weighting the first Barker factor as independently "heavy" against the State before fully analyzing the remaining factors and by overturning the circuit court's factual findings—the district's most significant Supreme Court correction during the window.

Judge JoAnne Kloppenburg

District IV—Madison

Judge Kloppenburg was elected to the Court of Appeals in 2012, following a 23-year career as an Assistant Attorney General at the Wisconsin DOJ (1989–2012)—including a decade as Director of the Environmental Protection Unit. She was a two-time candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Kloppenburg authored the most opinions of any District IV judge during the evaluation period, spanning insurance contract law (Badgerland v. Federated), environmental permitting (Sierra Club v. DNR), constitutional challenges (State v. Wilhite), and criminal procedure (State v. Bell). In State v. VanderGalien, Kloppenburg distinguished Luedtke while applying rational basis review to non-impairing metabolites—the kind of precedent engagement Cook v. Cook contemplates at the intermediate-appellate level. In Jahimiak v. Jahimiak, she authored the majority establishing the first-impression rule that the 60-day deadline in § 767.17(3) is directory rather than mandatory.

Judge Jennifer Nashold

District IV—Madison

Judge Nashold was elected to the Court of Appeals in 2019 and re-elected unopposed in 2025. Her administrative-law credentials are among the deepest on the court: eight years as an Administrative Law Judge at the Division of Hearings and Appeals (2011–2019); Chief Legal Counsel to the Department of Children and Families; General Counsel to the Public Service Commission; Chairperson of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission; and six years as an Assistant Attorney General at the Wisconsin DOJ.

Nashold has used her deep credentials to navigate the district's agency-review caseload, authoring Birge v. Simplicity on consumer protection and the statute of frauds. With the smallest sample size in the district, Nashold has consistently endorsed the district's unanimous Tetra Tech and criminal-procedure outputs.

Judge Chris Taylor

District IV—Madison

Judge Taylor was appointed to the Dane County Circuit Court by Governor Evers in 2020—her first judicial appointment—and elected unopposed to the Court of Appeals in 2023, succeeding retiring Judge Michael Fitzpatrick. Before the bench, she served nine years in the Wisconsin State Assembly (2011–2020), including a seat on the Joint Committee on Finance, and earlier served as public policy director for Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin.

Taylor authored Hubbard v. Neuman, construing Wisconsin's informed consent statute, § 448.30, broadly to reach physicians who recommend and help plan a procedure even when they do not perform it. Her review in Hubbard was methodical—consulting Black's Law Dictionary, cross-referencing related statutory definitions, and engaging the statute's own exceptions to rebut the defendant's absurd-results arguments—even as the resulting interpretation was noted for its expansive reach. The Supreme Court affirmed 5-2, with Justices Ziegler and R.G. Bradley dissenting that the majority had failed to adequately define who qualifies as a "treating physician."

Notable District IV Opinions

State v. Ramirez (2024 WI App 28), rev'd, (2025 WI 28)

The Court of Appeals (Graham, J., joined by Kloppenburg, J., and Blanchard, J.) held that the defendant's constitutional speedy trial right was violated under the Barker v. Wingo four-factor test, finding the 46-month pretrial delay required dismissal. Over 31 months were attributable to the State, driven by unexplained scheduling gaps, courtroom double-bookings, prosecutor retirement, and witness unavailability. The Supreme Court reversed 5-2 (R.G. Bradley, J.), concluding the Court of Appeals erred in weighing the first Barker factor as independently "heavy" against the State before fully analyzing the remaining factors and in overturning the circuit court's factual findings.

Hubbard v. Neuman (2024 WI App 22), aff'd, 2025 WI 15

The Court of Appeals (Taylor, J., joined by Blanchard and Graham, JJ.) affirmed the circuit court's denial of a physician's motion to dismiss an informed consent claim under Wis. Stat. § 448.30. The court held that the duty to inform applies to "any physician who treats a patient," not only to the physician who performs the surgery. The Supreme Court affirmed 5-2 (A.W. Bradley, C.J.). Justice Ziegler, joined by Justice R.G. Bradley, dissented, arguing the majority interpreted "physician who treats" too broadly and failed to adequately define who qualifies as a treating physician under § 448.30.

Supreme Court Interactions

The Wisconsin Supreme Court's review of Court of Appeals opinions provides an external check on appellate quality. During the evaluation period, several Court of Appeals opinions were reviewed by the Supreme Court, with outcomes ranging from affirmance to unanimous reversal.

District II: The Most Reversals

District II produced the most Supreme Court reversals of any district. The Kaul v. Legislature unanimous reversal (7-0), the WMC v. DNR reversal (5-2), the Halter v. WIAA reversal (5-2), and the Oconomowoc v. Cota reversal (5-2) collectively represent a correction of District II's approach to statutory interpretation and separation-of-powers questions. In each case, Judge Neubauer had dissented from the Court of Appeals majority—a pattern that warrants close attention as District II's composition evolves.

District IV: Contested Affirmance and Reversal

District IV's Ramirez reversal (5-2, with Justice R.G. Bradley writing for the majority) and the contested Hubbard affirmance (5-2, with Justices Ziegler and Grassl Bradley dissenting) reflect ongoing doctrinal disagreement at the Supreme Court level, particularly on criminal procedure and statutory expansion questions.

District I: One Procedural Reversal

The State v. J.D.B. reversal (6-1) was the only significant Supreme Court correction of a District I opinion. The reversal addressed procedural requirements for involuntary medication orders rather than a fundamental methodological disagreement.

District III: No Completed Reversals

District III had no completed Supreme Court reversals during the evaluation period, though Outagamie v. MJB is pending review. The absence of reversals may reflect the district's cohesive methodology, its smaller and less politically charged docket, or simply the Supreme Court's limited bandwidth.

Appendix I: Opinions Analyzed

This appendix lists all published Wisconsin Court of Appeals opinions from January 1, 2024—December 31, 2025.

District I—Milwaukee (15 opinions)

Operating under an aggressive publication filter, District I's authorship is heavily weighted toward complex commercial disputes and novel constitutional procedure, with Judge Geenen serving as the panel's primary authorial voice.

District II—Waukesha (42 opinions)

The epicenter of Wisconsin's structural litigation. District II presents an immense volume of consequential opinions, showcasing sharp methodological divides—particularly between Judge Neubauer and the panel majority—on questions of executive authority and statutory interpretation.

District III—Wausau (26 opinions)

The most cohesive panel in Wisconsin jurisprudence. Operating without a single dissent, Judges Stark, Hruz, and Gill collectively navigated a docket deeply embedded in localized, pragmatic disputes spanning municipal governance, land use, and complex commercial insurance.

District IV—Madison (30 opinions)

Anchored in the seat of the sovereign, District IV maintains a near-monopoly on the review of executive agency actions. The district's five jurists consistently apply methodical, text-bound analysis to the state's most complex regulatory and administrative challenges.

Appendix II: Appellate Court Reference Guide

Institutional Context

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals is primarily an error-correction court. Its published opinions are binding precedent across all four districts until overruled by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188 (1997). The Supreme Court has recognized that published Court of Appeals opinions serve a "law defining and law development" function. The Court issues a written decision in every case. A Publication Committee determines which opinions are published and citable as precedential authority under Wis. Stat. § 809.23. Opinion assignment is by lot.

Standards of Review

Statutory Interpretation: The Kalal Framework

State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45: Begin with the statutory language. If the meaning is plain, stop and apply. Only if the text is ambiguous may the court consult extrinsic sources. The ambiguity gateway is the structural feature: extrinsic sources are permissible only after a threshold finding of ambiguity.

Administrative Deference: The Tetra Tech Framework

Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, eliminated Chevron-style deference in Wisconsin. Courts review agency legal conclusions de novo. Permissible under § 227.57(10): acknowledging agency technical expertise as an input to the court's own independent analysis. Impermissible: treating the agency's legal interpretation as presumptively correct.

Precedent Hierarchy

• SCOW opinions bind all lower courts.
• Published CoA opinions bind all districts under Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166 (1997).
• Unpublished opinions after July 1, 2009, authored by a panel member, may be cited for persuasive value only. § 809.23(3)(b).
• CoA panels cannot overrule SCOWIS. Legitimate channels: concurrence/dissent inviting reconsideration, or certification under § 809.61.
• On federal-law questions, U.S. Supreme Court controls under the Supremacy Clause.

Constitutional Avoidance

Courts must decide on statutory or sub-constitutional grounds when available and adequately briefed before reaching a constitutional question.

Presumption of Constitutionality and Burden of Proof

A party challenging a statute's constitutionality must prove it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Every presumption is indulged to sustain the law. Doubt is resolved in favor of constitutionality. Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶17; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11.

Holding vs. Dicta in Controlling Precedent

The holding of a case is the rule of law necessary to the disposition of the specific issue before the court. Dicta is everything else—observations, illustrations, hypotheticals, and statements about issues the court did not need to resolve. A footnote in a majority opinion may be holding or dicta depending on whether it resolves an issue necessary to the disposition. A concurrence or dissent is never holding. An explicit reservation of a question ("we express no opinion on X") is the court's declaration that X is not part of its holding.

When reading a controlling case, a CoA judge must distinguish what the court held from what it said. Reliance on dicta is permissible for persuasive guidance but cannot be treated as controlling. Reliance on a dissent as though it were the majority's holding is a hierarchy error. And treating an explicitly reserved question as though the court resolved it is a misreading of the precedent.