Rebecca Frank Dallet

“Although implied repeal is \u201Cnot a favored concept in the law,\u201D it is nonetheless deeply rooted in Wisconsin law and is indeed older than the state itself.”

“The word ‘offense’ is a familiar term that is generally defined as ‘an infraction of the law’ or as ‘a transgression of law; a crime.’ Standing alone, these definitions are broad enough to include both criminal and non-criminal offenses.”

“Although I am open to revisiting our § 10(1)(b) jurisprudence, this case is not a 'clear opportunity' to do so. Petitioners do not ask us to overturn any of our prior decisions, let alone reimagine completely our approach under § 10(1)(b).”

“Clear rules governing finality are essential for courts and parties. That is because the entry of a final order or judgment under § 808.03(1) starts the clock for filing an appeal. Without clear rules governing finality, parties may thus unintentionally lose their right to appeal.”

“Twenty-one years ago, in Kalal, our court declared that ‘the general framework for statutory interpretation in Wisconsin requires some clarification.’ Over the ensuing nine paragraphs, the majority opinion purported to declare in exhaustive fashion ‘[t]he principles of statutory interpretation . . . rooted in and fundamental to the rule of law.’”

“Section 111.32(1) uses inclusive, rather than limiting, language: it states that an individual’s arrest record ‘includes, but is not limited to,’ the types of information listed in the statute.”

“The fact that the statute refers to ‘any’ other offense brought by ‘any’ law enforcement authority likewise supports an inclusive interpretation of ‘offense.’”

“Canons of construction, however, are not inflexible rules and no single canon ‘will always take precedence over all other principles of construction.’”

“Interpreting the definition of ‘arrest record’ to include non-criminal offenses furthers this purpose by ensuring that similar conduct results in similar protections, regardless of how it is charged.”

“As we said in Sundby, 'the constitutional requisites of art. V, sec. 10, fully anticipate that the governor's action may alter the policy as written in the bill sent to the governor by the legislature.' In other words, the governor may, through a partial veto, change the bill's substance.”

“If the finality of every post-judgment order depends on the resolution of every other conceivable post-judgment issue, there is a real risk that appellate review may be delayed indefinitely, if it’s available at all.”

“When evaluating the finality of an order entered after judgment, courts generally treat the post-judgment proceeding as if it were a lawsuit distinct from the suit that generated the underlying judgment.”