Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley, a Milwaukee native, was elected to the Supreme Court in 2016 after being appointed by Gov. Scott Walker in 2015. She is the first Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice to have served as an intermediate appellate court judge as well as a circuit court judge. Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Bradley served as a District I Court of Appeals judge (appointed 2015), a Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge (appointed 2012, elected 2013) and worked as an attorney in private practice (1996–2012), including serving as vice president of legal operations for a global software company. To read her full biography, click here.
Rebecca Grassl Bradley is a justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where she has served since October 2015. A Milwaukee native, she is the first Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice to have served at every level of the state judicial system — circuit court, intermediate appellate court, and supreme court.
Before joining the Supreme Court, Grassl Bradley served on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals — District I, where she was appointed in 2015. Before that, she served as a Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge, appointed in 2012 and elected in 2013. Earlier in her career, she practiced commercial and constitutional law in private practice for 16 years, including a stint as vice president of legal operations for a global software company.
Grassl Bradley was appointed to the Supreme Court by Governor Scott Walker in October 2015 to fill a vacancy, then won her own ten-year term in April 2016 by defeating Court of Appeals Judge JoAnne Kloppenburg. Her current term runs through 2026.
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Justice Bradley is the court's most consistently formalist member during the 2024–25 term. She anchors statutory and constitutional analysis in original public meaning, drawing on founding-era sources—Locke, Madison, Blackstone, and 1850-era law dictionaries—to fix the meaning of disputed text at the moment of enactment. Her separation-of-powers writing emphasizes the structural boundaries between the branches and resists the consolidation of lawmaking authority within administrative agencies. On stare decisis, she demands a special justification before discarding precedent: in WEC v. LeMahieu, she followed a precedent she personally disagrees with because no party asked the court to overrule it. Her concurrence in SEIU Healthcare v. WERC defended the Kalal framework against proposals to replace it with a more "holistic," intent-based interpretive method.
“In America, the Law is King. The majority of this court has deposed the Law. There is no greater affront to democracy. There is no greater threat to our Republic.”
“The People never consented to be ruled by bureaucratic overlords.”
“‘Properly applied, the plain-meaning approach is not “literalistic”; rather, the ascertainment of meaning involves a “process of analysis” focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself.’”
“Kalal reminded Wisconsin’s judges that our role is to interpret the laws ‘enacted by the legislature’ by ascertaining their plain meaning.”
“The majority erases a law it does not like, making four lawyers sitting on the state\u2019s highest court more powerful than the People\u2019s representatives in the legislature.”
“LIRC missed the fair meaning forest for the literalistic trees, producing a preposterous distortion of the law.”
“The majority mistakes a conclusion of law for a finding of fact. Whether an employer unlawfully terminated an employee based on his arrest record is a conclusion of law.”
“‘Whether the facts found by an agency fulfill a particular legal standard is a question of law, not a question of fact.’”
“While the court may be bound by LIRC’s findings of fact, it is supposed to independently interpret the law.”
“Not all evidence is created equal—extrinsic evidence is always subordinate to intrinsic sources, and rarely relevant.”
“Legislative history is ‘neither truly legislative (having failed to survive bicameralism and presentment) nor truly historical (consisting of advocacy aimed at winning in future litigation what couldn’t be won in past statutes).’”
“Legislative history should never be used to refute a statute’s unambiguous plain meaning.”